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When you lack the facts, how do you decide what is true and what is not? In the absence
of knowledge, we sometimes rely on non-probative information. For example, participants
judge concretely worded trivia items as more likely to be true than abstractly worded ones
(the linguistic truth effect; Hansen & Wänke, 2010). If minor language differences affect truth
judgements, ultimately they could influence more consequential political, legal, health, and
interpersonal choices. This Registered Report includes two high-powered replication attempts
of Experiment 1 from Hansen and Wänke (2010). Experiment 1a was a dual-site, in-person
replication of the linguistic concreteness effect in the original paper-and-pencil format (n =
253, n = 246 in analyses). Experiment 1b replicated the study with an online sample (n =
237, n = 220 in analyses). In Experiment 1a, the effect of concreteness on judgements of truth
(Cohen’s dz=0.08; 95% CI: [-0.03, 0.18]) was smaller than that of the original study. Similarly,
in Experiment 1b the effect (Cohen’s dz=0.11; 95% CI [-0.01, 0.22]) was smaller than that of the
original study. Collectively, the pattern of results is inconsistent with that of the original study.
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The perceived truth of a statement can be influenced by factors
other than its probative, informational content (Koriat & Adiv,
2012), including the source of the information, the context
in which it is presented, and characteristics of the statement
itself (Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010). This paper
examines an effect of the statement wording: Participants
judge concretely worded trivia items as more likely to be
true than abstractly worded versions of the same content (the
linguistic concreteness effect; Hansen & Wänke, 2010). For
instance, the statement, “The poet C. Dickens wrote the play
Miss Sara Sampson,” was judged more likely to be true than
the more abstract equivalent, “The play Miss Sara Sampson is
by the poet C. Dickens.” Across all statements, more concrete
versions were judged as more probably true than their abstract
equivalents (Cohen’s dz = .48).
This manipulation is based on the linguistic category model
(Semin & Fiedler, 1988, 1991) which posits that a concrete
verb (“wrote”) conjures a vivid, reliable, and easily verifi-
able image, but an abstract one (“is by”) does not (Semin &
Fiedler, 1988). The model was originally designed to assess
descriptions of people’s behaviour, and it has also been ap-
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plied to analyses of persuasion and influence. For example,
prosecutors in the Nuremberg trials used concrete language
to signpost the responsibility of Nazi generals (Schmid &
Fiedler, 1996).
According to the model, descriptive action verbs, such as
“wrote” or “punch” require no interpretation; they refer to a
single, concrete, behavioural event and convey the percep-
tual properties of that event (e.g., “A punches B”). All of
the concrete statements used by Hansen and Wänke (2010)
contained such descriptive action verbs. In contrast, their
abstract statements described the same event but required
more interpretation (e.g., “A hurts B”). Although their abstract
statements were guided by the linguistic category model, they
did not fully implement it. Some of their abstract statements
contained no state verbs or adjectives, the two categories clas-
sified as abstract in the model. Those statements that lacked
state verbs or adjectives “map the criteria of the LCM of ab-
stractness (e.g., high stability, low situational dependency)” (J.
Hansen, personal communication, January 25, 2018) and rely
on characteristics associated with abstract word categories
rather than always containing the word categories themselves.
Replication Value
Understanding how and when belief in the truth of a statement
is influenced by its superficial characteristics rather than its
substance is of great practical and theoretical importance.
That a statement’s truthiness can influence judgements is well
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established (Fazio, Brashier, Payne, & Marsh, 2015; Newman,
Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2012; Newman et al.,
2015). Most studies examining the factors that influence
truth judgements, other than the statement’s substance, have
focused on the illusory truth effect (Hasher, Goldstein, &
Toppino, 1977); repeated statements are believed more than
new statements. A Google Scholar search for “illusory truth
effect” revealed 247 results, compared to 2 for “linguistic
concreteness effect” (Google Scholar, August 27, 2018). Yet,
Hansen and Wänke’s (2010) experiment underlies research on
the persuasiveness of concrete language in political communi-
cation (Menegatti & Rubini, 2013), voting intentions (Chou
& Yeh, 2018), and eyewitness testimony (Kurinec & Weaver
III, 2018). Given the ease with which this concrete/abstract
manipulation can be applied in practice and the estimated
effect from the original study (dz = 0.48), the experimental
manipulation merits further investigation and a more precise
estimate of the effect size. In practice, manipulation of be-
liefs via linguistic concreteness might be easier to do and
harder for readers to notice. If robust, the effects of linguistic
concreteness could potentially be combined with the illusory
truth effect (or other such effects) to yield even greater effects
on beliefs.
Despite its theoretical and practical implications, the effect
of linguistic concreteness on truth judgements has not been
independently replicated, either conceptually or closely. In
light of this paucity of research, combined with the practical
implications of the effect if it proves robust, we designed two
high-powered replications using sample sizes substantially
bigger than the original study. We undertook this research
for three further reasons. First, Hansen and Wänke’s (2010)
experiment has been heavily cited (102 citations according
to Google Scholar, August 27, 2018, approximately 10 times
the mean for 2010) and used to motivate research on topics
ranging from political persuasion to eyewitness testimony.
It has also been discussed in the media as a technique for
increasing trustworthiness (e.g., Stott, 2011). Second, the
relatively subtle manipulation of concreteness yielded an ef-
fect size of Cohen’s dz = 0.48, but the sample size (n=46)
means that the estimate was not precise (95% CI [0.19, 0.78]).
A direct replication using the same materials will verify the
effect and estimate its size more precisely. Finally our second
experiment will directly replicate the original study using
the same design, but with a different source of participants
(online) to determine whether the effect is equally robust.
The Present Experiments
With guidance from the original authors, we designed a high-
powered, pre-registered replication of Experiment 1 from
Hansen and Wänke (2010). We aimed to match, as closely
as possible, the conditions and methods of the original paper
with an implementation that addressed those factors that the
original authors believe are necessary for obtaining the effect.
Like the original study, we tested the prediction that partic-
ipants would judge concretely worded trivia items as more
probably true than abstractly worded versions (H1 - confirma-
tory hypothesis). We also added several enhancements and
extensions. First, to test whether the effect would generalise
beyond the originally sampled population, we tested partic-
ipants in the United Kingdom and the United States, both
with in-person samples and online. Second, to ensure that our
primary hypothesis tests were adequately powered to detect
the original effect and to enable a more precise measure of
the effect size, we tested approximately five times as many
participants as the original experiment. Third, in their fourth
study, Hansen and Wänke (2010) inferred that some partici-
pants already knew answers to some of the trivia items (i.e.,
their objective truth value). Consequently, we added a check
for prior knowledge of the answers to the trivia questions.
Finally, at the suggestion of the first author of the original
study, we used an expanded stimulus set to test the exploratory
hypothesis that the perceived psychological distance of the
statement content would interact with the concreteness of the
wording (H2 - exploratory hypothesis).
For both experiments, we report how we determined our
sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations,
and all measures (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012).
Our preregistration, materials, and data are available on the
Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/s2389/. Our stage 1
manuscript, and a supplement outlining the changes between
our stage 1 and stage 2 manuscripts, can also be found there.
Experiment 1a
Experiment 1a was designed to replicate the linguistic con-
creteness effect (Hansen & Wänke, 2010, Experiment 1).
Participants judged the truth of trivia items and we assessed
whether, in the absence of self-reported knowledge of the
correct answer, their judgements were influenced by the con-
creteness of the wording.
Method
Our replication follows the procedures of the original paper
and uses the original materials provided by the authors (trans-
lated from the original German wording). In consultation with
J. Hansen (personal communication, January 25, March 01,
April 09, and April 16, 2018), we further adapted those mate-
rials to our participant populations in order to test the same
hypotheses as the original (see below). Differences between
this experiment and the original are outlined in the “Known
Differences from the Original Study” section below. The
experimental procedures were approved by both the Kingston
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University Research Ethics Committee and the University
of Illinois Institutional Review Board. Participants provided
informed consent before participating.
Sampling Plan. There is no clear theoretical lowest effect
size of interest for the linguistic concreteness effect that we
can use as the basis of a power analysis. As an alternative,
we could use the effect size from the original study for power
analysis, but that effect size might not reflect the “true” effect
due to chance variation, sampling error, and the possibility of
publication bias. Consequently, we conducted a sensitivity
power analysis using G*Power 3.1.7 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007) to determine the smallest effect that we would
have high statistical power (95%) to detect given pragmatic
constraints on our total sample size. Our preregistered plan
was to collect usable data from 210 participants (five-times
the original sample size), which would give our study 95%
power to detect an effect size of dz = 0.228 at α = .05 (one-
sided). Hansen and Wänke (2010) reported effect sizes (η2p)
of .19 and .081 (for Experiments 1 and 2 respectively), which
correspond to Cohen’s dz of 0.477 and 0.292 (Lakens, 2013).
Given that both reported effects are larger than dz = 0.228,
our planned sample had greater than 95% power to detect the
originally reported effects as well (with our sample size, we
have greater than 95% power to detect an effect that is 50%
the size of the original Experiment 1).
Participants. Undergraduate students (and some masters
students in the UK) participated in the study in exchange for
course credit or a chance to win one of three £50 prizes. These
incentives were used in Hansen and Wänke’s (2010) Exper-
iment 1 and Experiment 2, respectively. Participants were
recruited via a dual-site collaboration enabled by StudySwap
(Chartier & McCarthy, 2018); approximately half the par-
ticipants were from Kingston University, UK and half from
the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, USA. For
recruiting purposes, and in line with the original study, the
experiment was described as a “study on truth judgements.”
Our final sample was larger than our target sample due to
higher signup rates and lower no-show rates than anticipated
during scheduling (UK: n = 130, Mage = 24.7; USA: n = 123,
Mage = 19.3).
Materials. Two native German speakers translated the orig-
inal 52 trivia statements from German to English. These
items cover a myriad of general knowledge topics including
history, geography, and science. Half of the statements are
true and half are false. All statements are plausible but de-
scribe facts that few participants know. Each trivia item has
both an abstract and a concrete version, with concreteness
determined using linguistic category model criteria (Semin &
Fiedler, 1988, 1991). For example, in the first statement in
Table 1, “wrote” is more concrete (i.e., a descriptive action
verb) than “is by.” To maximise the chance of observing the
linguistic concreteness effect, we took care to ensure that the
English translations complied with the description of the origi-
nal items. For each statement: 1) the concrete version contains
a descriptive action verb; 2) both versions were approximately
the same length; and 3) the abstract and concrete versions
used equally common language because any unusual words
were common to both versions of each statement (e.g., words
like “bandoneon” were core to the content of the statement).
The translation was checked by the first author of the original
paper.
Updated statements.
Hansen and Wänke (2010) argued that the match between con-
creteness and psychological/physical distance also influences
truth judgements. In their Experiment 4, concretely worded
items presented in the foreground of a landscape photograph
(i.e., close) were judged to be more true than those presented
in the background. Similarly, abstract items presented in the
background were judged to be more true than those presented
in the foreground. These effects presumably result from a
match in the participant’s mindset: both physical proximity
and linguistic concreteness activate a more “concrete” mindset
which increases judged truth values. A mismatch in those
factors reduces truth judgements. In reviewing our replication
plan, Hansen suggested that the content of some original
items might induce a similar “distance” effect. In the original
experiment, some of the statements related to culture and
history local to Switzerland, and those statements might be
more psychologically distant for a Briton or an American.
That distance might interact with the linguistic concreteness
effect.1
The original experiment was conducted at a university in
Switzerland. The first author coded each statement as being
either spatially close, distant, or neutral from Switzerland, the
UK, and the USA, and these judgements were checked by the
first author of the original study. We then generated additional
trivia items (modelled on the originals) for those deemed
close for Swiss participants but far for Britons (8 items) or
Americans (18 items).2 Thus, participants in the UK judged
a total of 60 items and USA participants judged 70 items
(see Table 2). The new statements were modified versions of
the original items created by swapping words that conveyed
spatial distance for our participants for equivalent spatially
close words while maintaining the concreteness/abstractness
of the original item. For example, we changed “In Hamburg,
one can count the largest number of bridges in Europe” to
“In London you can count the largest number of surveillance
cameras in Europe.” We did not change the actual truth of
1We analyzed the original data from Hansen and Wänke’s (2010)
Experiment 1 and did not observe the predicted effect of distance.
2One statement (about Swiss Cantons) that was likely not under-
standable for UK and USA participants was amended and remains
in the original 52.
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Table 1
Examples of Trivia Statements with Abstract and Concrete Phrasings.
Statement Concrete Abstract
1 The poet C. Dickens wrote the play Miss Sara Sampson. The play Miss Sara Sampson is by the poet C. Dickens.
2 The Roe River flows into the Missouri River. The Roe River is a tributary of the Missouri River.
3 People nicknamed the Cuban composer Esteban Salas y
Castro the "Santiago Angel".
The Cuban composer Esteban Salas y Castro was also
known as the "Santiago Angel".
Note: Statements 1 and 3 are false: The author of Miss Sara Sampson is Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. Esteban Salas y Castro had
no well-known nickname.
the new statements (i.e., if the original statement was true the
replacement was also true). The statements, modifications,
and plans for confirmatory analyses were discussed with the
first author of the original paper. Confirmatory analyses were
carried out on both the 52 original statements, and the up-
dated version containing 52 statements in which distant state-
ments have been removed and replaced with close statements.
Planned secondary analyses explored whether the linguistic
concreteness effect differed for the matched subsets of original
and replacement items (8 for Britons and 18 for Americans).
Table 2
Psychological distance of the original items in each country
(with numbers of replaced items).
Spatial psychological distance
Stimuli Close Distant Neutral
Swiss Original Study
Original items 20 12 20
UK Replication
Original items 12 20 20
Changed 8 -8 0
USA Replication
Original items 3 30 19
Changed 17 -18 1
Note. Original = original 52 statements; Changed = number of
added or removed statements needed to match the proportions
in original set.
Statement verification.
Before conducting the study, we followed the same procedures
used by Hansen and Wänke (2010) to ensure that the concrete
versions of the statements were seen as more concrete than
were the abstract ones. We combined all trivia items into a
single set of 78 (52 original + 18 USA-specific items + 8
Britain-specific items), and then created two sets of 78 items
(set A and set B) so that the concrete and abstract version of
each item appeared in different sets. Four student raters (2 for
set A and 2 for set B), who were blind to the experimental hy-
pothesis and who were briefly trained on the pertinent aspects
of the linguistic category model (see https://osf.io/s2389/ for
complete training instructions) then independently coded each
item on a 1 (most concrete) to 4 (most abstract) scale. For
set A, the correlation between raters was r = .77. For set B,
the correlation between raters was r = .81. As in the original
experiment, concrete versions were consistently coded as
more concrete than their corresponding abstract versions (see
Table 3).
In the experiment, the statements were presented in the same
two sets (A and B), and in same order as in the original exper-
iment, with the new items randomly interspersed among them
(we used https://www.randomizer.org/ to allocate positions).
If a new version of a statement was assigned to a position
within five places of the corresponding original statement, it
was re-randomised. In each set, half of the statements are
actually true and half are false. Each trivia item appears
only once in each set, in either its abstract or concrete form;
statements presented as concrete in set A were presented as
abstract in set B, and vice versa. The concreteness and actual
truth of the statements were fully crossed.3
In the original study the statements were presented across four
pages, with the following number of statements on each page:
15 (including instructions), 17, 17, 3. We standardised the
number of statements presented across the paper-and-pencil
(Experiment 1a) and online formats (Experiment 1b). The
first page presented the instructions and four statements; each
page thereafter contained six statements (except that the last
page in the UK set contained two statements). The UK set
consisted of 11 pages and the USA set consisted of 12 pages.4
Procedure. The experiment followed the procedure used
by Hansen and Wänke (2010), including directly translated
3Note that in the original study, sets A and B had unequal num-
bers of concrete and abstract versions of the items (the design was
not fully crossed between truth value and concreteness). To fully
cross the factors in the replication, we swapped the concrete and
abstract versions of two of the original items between set A and set
B.
4Due to a copy/paste error in creating the printed packets for the
USA versions, the item numbering was out of sequence (. . . 38, 39,
40, 44, 45, 46, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48 . . . ). We noticed the error after
testing had already started, so we did not change it for the remaining
participants. The sequence was correct for the USA online version
and for both laboratory and online UK versions.
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Table 3
Coder concreteness ratings for concrete and abstract statements, their difference, and the confidence interval around that
difference
Statements n Concrete M(SD) Abstract M(SD) Diff 95% CI
Overall 78 1.67 (0.69) 3.27 (0.59) -1.60 [-1.81, -1.40]
SetA 78 1.75 (0.75) 3.28 (0.60) -1.53 [-1.85, -1.22]
SetB 78 1.59 (0.62) 3.26 (0.60) -1.67 [-1.96, -1.39]
True 39 1.77 (0.81) 3.36 (0.57) -1.59 [-1.91, -1.28]
False 39 1.57 (0.53) 3.19 (0.61) -1.61 [-1.89, -1.34]
Old 52 1.78 (0.72) 3.27 (0.62) -1.49 [-1.74, -1.23]
New 26 1.45 (0.57) 3.28 (0.56) -1.83 [-2.19, -1.48]
instructions. It was administered as a paper-and-pencil ques-
tionnaire study to students enrolled in introductory psychol-
ogy and other undergraduate and masters psychology classes.
The experiment was conducted in classrooms. Participants
were given one of the two versions of the questionnaire (set
A or set B) containing 60 (UK) or 70 (USA) statements in
a fixed random order. Questionnaire packs were distributed
to participants in each sample in alternating order to ensure
that approximately equal numbers of participants received
each set. In each set, half the statements were actually true
and half were false, and for each actual truth value, half the
statements were abstract and half concrete. Items that were
concrete in Set A were abstract in Set B, and vice versa.
Participants were asked to judge the truth of each statement
on a scale ranging from 1 (definitely false) to 6 (definitely true;
Hansen & Wänke, 2010, p. 1579). In short, English-speaking
participants at each testing site were randomly assigned to a 2
(concreteness of statements: concrete vs. abstract) x 2 (actual
truth: true vs. false) x 2 (statement set: set A vs. set B) mixed
design with the first two factors varied within participants and
the last factor varied between participants.
In Experiment 4 of Hansen and Wänke (2010), which used
a subset of these statements, the authors inferred from the
pattern of responses that a few participants knew the answers
to some items. We added a check for prior knowledge to
ensure that ratings were of items with unknown truth value.
After completing all truth judgements, participants viewed
the list of items again, and indicated next to each item if they
knew the answer to that item. After completing the trivia
items and the knowledge check, participants reported their
age, gender, nationality, the number of years they had lived in
the UK/USA, and whether they had used any sources to find
out answers to any of the items. Finally, participants were
thanked and debriefed. The experimental tasks were self-
paced and took approximately 10-20 minutes to complete.
The experimenter remained in the room for the duration of
the experiment. Given that successful recruiting from the
subject pool in the USA required a longer testing session (ap-
proximately 40 minutes was needed to receive a full credit),
most participants in the USA completed an additional packet
of questionnaires following completion of the tasks for this
study (see online supplement for more information).
The experimental data were entered into spreadsheets. The
UK data files were verified by re-entering all numbers and
cross-checking discrepancies. The USA data files were veri-
fied by reading aloud the entered numbers from the spread-
sheet while an assistant verified that they matched the re-
sponses in the packets. Any entirely ambiguous responses
(e.g., two numbers marked) were coded as missing. These
verified data files are stored on OSF along with the data from
Experiment 1b.
Results
Analysis scripts were generated from pilot data that was
created by having the first author repeatedly complete each
survey herself (varying her responses to questions to allow
tests of various exclusion rules). All analyses were written
using R (R Core Team, 2018) and the following packages:
tidyverse (Wickham, 2017), janitor (Firke, 2018), datatable
(Dowle & Srinivasan, 2018), varhandle (Mahmoudian, 2018),
ez (Lawrence, 2016), BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder, 2018),
summarytools (Comtois, 2018), and bootES (Gerlanc & Kirby,
2015). This manuscript was written in RMarkdown (Allaire
et al., 2018) and formatted using papaja (Aust & Barth, 2018),
knitr (Xie, 2015), kableExtra (Zhu, 2018), and xtable (Dahl,
2016). The RMarkdown file includes the full analysis script
and results are analyzed and inserted into the manuscript with-
out human intervention. The scripts, data, and RMarkdown
files are available at https://osf.io/s2389/. Unless explicitly
noted otherwise, all exclusion rules and analyses followed the
pre-registered plan specified in our stage 1 manuscript.
For the primary analyses, data were pooled across country
(UK and USA) and across set (A and B). The original study
excluded no participants. We excluded responses to any items
that were already known by a participant (as indicated by
checking the box next to that item in the knowledge check),
regardless of whether their actual answer was correct or in-
correct. We excluded data from any participant who elected
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to end their participation prior to completing the study (n=4),
who self-reported using technological aids to answer ques-
tions (n=2), or who responded uniformly (e.g., always answer
1) to all statements in either the original 52 items or the new
set of 52 items (n=0).
In addition to the preregistered exclusion criteria, we excluded
participants who reported knowing 59 or more items (n=1)
because they could not be included in the primary analyses
after excluding “known” items (see Table 4). Finally, we
did not enter data from one additional USA participant who
the experimenter observed marking responses in a pattern
(1-2-3-4-5-6-5-4-3-2-1, etc.) without reading the items.
For both Experiment 1a and 1b, as in the original paper, our
primary, confirmatory analyses examined the effect of con-
creteness of language on the perceived truth of trivia state-
ments, with the six-point Likert ratings as the dependent mea-
sure. The linguistic concreteness effect predicts that Likert
scores should be higher for concretely worded statements
than for more abstractly worded statements. We separately
computed each participant’s mean rating across items falling
into each combination of the truth of the statement (true/false)
and the concreteness of the statement (concrete/abstract). Our
confirmatory hypothesis tests were based on the data after
exclusions and after removing any items that participants
reported having known previously, and the online supplement
presents further exploratory analyses including items that
participants reported knowing already.
Primary confirmatory analyses. The original study used
a mixed-design ANOVA to analyse the effects of concreteness,
actual truth, and set. Given that we had no a-priori hypotheses
about actual truth or set, we did not use an ANOVA for our
confirmatory hypothesis test. For completeness, we report the
results of a comparable ANOVA (adding country as a factor)
in the online supplementary materials at https://osf.io/s2389/.
As a test of the linguistic concreteness effect, we directly
compared the average responses to concrete and abstract state-
ments in a paired, one-sided t-test for the original 52 items
(H1). Average ratings for concrete items (M = 3.57, S D =
0.41) were about the same as those for abstract items (M =
3.54, S D = 0.41), t(245) = 1.21, p = .115, BF10 = 0.29 (The
Bayes Factor used rscale = 0.336, the dr effect size for the
original study, as an informed alternative hypothesis.) The
Bayes Factor shows that our observed difference is 3.45 times
more consistent with the null hypothesis of no difference or a
negative effect than with a distribution centred at the original
effect size.
Given that the t-test was not statistically significant, we com-
pared the upper confidence bound around the observed effect
(observed effect: Cohen’s dz=0.08; 95% CI: [-0.03, 0.18])
to the criterion value from our sensitivity power analysis
(Cohen’s dz = 0.228) to determine whether the observed ef-
Table 4
Participants recruited, excluded, and analyzed, separated
by country, set, and gender for Experiment 1a
Group N recruited N excluded N analyzed
UK Set A
Male 8 0 8
Female 55 2 53
Gender Variant 0 0 0
Not Reported 1 1 0
UK Set B
Male 11 1 10
Female 52 0 52
Gender Variant 1 0 1
Not Reported 2 2 0
USA Set A
Male 17 1 16
Female 43 0 43
Gender Variant 1 0 1
Not Reported 1 0 1
USA Set B
Male 30 0 30
Female 30 0 30
Gender Variant 0 0 0
Not Reported 1 0 1
Total 253 7 246
Note. Recruited includes all participants who started the
study, even if they did not complete it.
fect was “inferior” to that planned minimum effect (Lakens,
Scheel, & Isager, 2018). Because the upper bound of the confi-
dence interval was smaller than 0.228, the observed difference
between truth ratings for the concrete and abstract statements
was statistically inferior to a positive effect of Cohen’s dz =
0.228.
The same analysis conducted on the revised set of 52 items
– replacing items that were close for the Swiss participants
in the original study with new items that were close for the
UK or USA participants (H1) – revealed a pattern that was
similar to that for the original 52 items: Average ratings for
concrete items (M = 3.58, S D = 0.40) were again about the
same as those for abstract items (M = 3.55, S D = 0.40),
t(245) = 1.60, p = .056, BF10 (with rscale = 0.336) = 0.49.
The Bayes Factor shows that our observed difference is 2.06
times more consistent with the null hypothesis of no differ-
ence or a negative effect than with a distribution centred at
the original effect size.
Given that the t-test was not statistically significant, we com-
pared the upper confidence bound around the observed effect
(observed effect: Cohen’s dz=0.10; 95% CI: [0.00, 0.20])
to the criterion value from our sensitivity power analysis
(Cohen’s dz = 0.228) to determine whether the observed ef-
fect was “inferior” to that planned minimum effect. Because
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the upper bound of the confidence interval was smaller than
0.228, the observed difference between truth ratings for the
concrete and abstract statements in the revised set of items
was statistically inferior to a positive effect of Cohen’s dz =
0.228.
Secondary exploratory analyses. Hansen and Wänke
(2010) found that physical distance moderated the linguis-
tic concreteness effect (Experiment 4). In their study, items
were displayed against a photographic background so that
they appeared either near or far. Concrete items were judged
to be more true when they were close and abstract items were
judged to be more true when they were far. In consulting with
Hansen about the design of our replication, he suggested a
conceptual replication of that effect based on the geographic
proximity of the item contents to our participants. That sug-
gestion motivated the addition of the new items, but it also
permits a conceptual replication of the proximity effect. We
compared truth ratings for the original “distant” versions of
statements (those judged to be geographically “close” for
Swiss participants but remote for participants in the UK or
USA) with the new replacements for those items (8 original
and updated items for the UK, and 17 for the USA; in the
USA, one additional close item was replaced by a neutral item
to ensure a fully crossed design with a total of 18 new items)
that were intended to be “close” for our participants (see
Table 5). For close items, the difference between concrete and
abstract should be positive, because of the conceptual “match”
between concrete and close and the mismatch between ab-
stract and close. In contrast, for distant items, the difference
between concrete and abstract should be negative, because of
the conceptual “mismatch” between concrete and distant and
the match between abstract and distant. Consequently, we
compared difference scores (Concrete − Abstract) between
the original (distant) and replacement (close) items with a
one-sided t-test (H2).
Partially consistent with the prediction that a match between
proximity and concreteness would increase truth judgements,
the difference between concrete and abstract was positive
for the close items (M=0.06), but it was also positive for
the distant items (M=0.02), and near zero in both cases,
t(245) = 0.67, p = .253.
Experiment 1b
The research reported in Hansen and Wänke (2010) tested
undergraduate participants in person using paper-and-pencil
materials. This extension attempted to replicate the linguistic
concreteness effect using the same materials as Experiment
1a but in an online setting.
A growing literature suggests that people process online mate-
rial more superficially, relying on heuristics to judge message
credibility (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013; Sundar, Knobloch-
Westerwick, & Hastall, 2007) and believability (Sungur, Hart-
mann, & Koningsbruggen, 2016). If so, we might expect to
observe a larger linguistic concreteness effect online. Con-
versely, a recent meta-analysis of studies of the illusory truth
effect (Dechêne et al., 2010) showed a reduction in effect size
online; when judgements of a set of repeated statements were
compared to judgements of new statements (between-items),
the effect size was reduced from d = .59 using paper-and-
pencil to d = .30 on the computer. The reasons for this reduc-
tion are unclear, but the authors suggested it might be due to
differences in presentation time (i.e., constrained intervals or
participant paced) or presentation appearance (i.e., how many
statements are presented at once). Given that Experiment 1b
samples from a different population using a different medium,
differences in absolute performance levels and the size of the
concreteness effect could differ between Experiments 1a and
1b for many reasons. Hence, rather than directly comparing
the effect sizes in the two studies, we report whether the
linguistic concreteness effect emerges in each study relative
to the same standard set by our sensitivity analysis.
Method
Participants. As for Experiment 1a, our plan was to con-
tinue recruiting participants until we had usable data from 210
participants, with approximately half from the USA and half
from the UK. Participants were recruited and tested online
using the Prolific platform and Qualtrics. We used Prolific’s
pre-screening to ensure that participants were between 18 and
65 years of age, listed English as their first language, and had
a “participation on Prolific” approval rating of 98% or higher
(Final sample: UK: n = 120, Mage = 34.3; USA: n = 117, Mage
= 33.2). The experimental procedure was approved by the
Kingston University Research Ethics Committee, and partici-
pants provided informed consent before completing the study.
Each participant was randomly assigned to set A or set B, and
as in Experiment 1a, they completed equal numbers of items
in each cell of a design that fully crossed concrete/abstract and
true/false. Upon completion of the experiment, participants
received £2.18 as compensation.
Materials and procedure. Except as noted, the materials
and procedure matched those used in Experiment 1a. To en-
sure that the formatting, font size, and number of statements
on each page were the same between Experiments 1a and 1b,
we created the Qualtrics survey used in Experiment 1b first
and produced the paper-and-pencil version from that version.
To promote consistency in the appearance of the items, we
constrained the study to allow participation only via a desktop
or laptop computer (rather than a handheld device). At the
end of the experiment, participants reported the type of device
they used to complete the survey and whether or not they used
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Table 5
Means and SDs for new items (close) and distant items (replaced original) for Experiments 1a and 1b.
Item type Concrete M(SD) Abstract M(SD) Diff r
Experiment 1a
Close 3.64 (0.62) 3.58 (0.56) 0.06 (0.72) 0.26
Distant 3.57 (0.56) 3.55 (0.54) 0.02 (0.64) 0.32
Experiment 1b
Close 3.59 (0.59) 3.55 (0.62) 0.05 (0.79) 0.16
Distant 3.60 (0.60) 3.54 (0.57) 0.06 (0.61) 0.46
Table 6
Participants recruited, excluded, and analyzed, separated
by country, set, and gender for Experiment 1b
Group N recruited N excluded N analyzed
UK Set A
Male 22 0 22
Female 37 1 36
Gender Variant 1 0 1
Not Reported 0 0 0
UK Set B
Male 23 1 22
Female 37 5 32
Gender Variant 0 0 0
Not Reported 0 0 0
USA Set A
Male 19 4 15
Female 37 2 35
Gender Variant 1 0 1
Not Reported 0 0 0
USA Set B
Male 33 2 31
Female 27 2 25
Gender Variant 0 0 0
Not Reported 0 0 0
Total 237 17 220
Note. Recruited includes all participants who started the
study, even if they did not complete it.
any technology to aid their responses. The UK survey can be
viewed at https://bit.ly/2NrUKmc, and the USA survey can
be viewed at https://bit.ly/2PLgrPF.
Results
The planned data analysis and exclusion rules were identical
to those of Experiment 1a, with an added criterion to account
for overly fast or slow completion of the study in the absence
of an experimenter observing data collection in person. We
set the “maximum time allowed” to 45 minutes within the
Prolific settings, and we also excluded participants who com-
pleted the study in less than 3 minutes.5 We excluded data
from any participant who elected to end their participation
prior to completing the study (n=0), who self-reported using
technological aids to answer questions (n=9), who responded
uniformly (e.g., always answer 1) to all statements in either
the original 52 items or the new set of 52 items (n=1), or
who reported knowing 59 or more items (n=1) because they
could not be included in the primary analyses after excluding
“known” items.
Given that online participants could cheat by looking up the
answers, and that we could not identify overly long response
times to individual questions using Qualtrics, we used the data
from Experiment 1a to establish a plausible accuracy level
(because participants in Experiment 1a could not easily cheat
in answering questions). We calculated the mean number of
questions that each participant correctly answered in Exper-
iment 1a, where we operationally defined a correct answer
as a response of 1 (definitely false) when the statement was
false and 6 (definitely true) when the statement was true. We
excluded any participant in Experiment 1b whose percentage
correct according to that same standard was more than three
standard deviations above the mean from Study 1a (Experi-
ment 1a M = 0.08, 3S D cutoff = 0.34; total excluded n=9;
note, though, that 3 of those participants had already been
excluded for self-reported use of technological aids).
Given that we anticipated needing to replace some excluded
participants, we initially collected data from 240 participants,
with the plan to test additional batches of 20 participants as
needed until we achieved final sample with usable data from
at least 210 participants (see Table 6).
Primary confirmatory analyses. As in Experiment 1a, we
compared the average responses to concrete and abstract state-
ments in a paired, one-sided t-test for the original 52 items
(H1). Average ratings for concrete items (M = 3.66, S D =
0.42) were about the same as those for abstract items (M
= 3.63, S D = 0.38), t(219) = 1.61, p = .055, BF10 (with
5The first author was able to complete the survey in approxi-
mately 2 minutes when responding randomly to all items and ne-
glecting to read the instructions. In pilot testing of the online version
of the study (Experiment 1b), no participant completed the study in
less than 5 minutes.
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rscale = 0.336) = 0.51. The Bayes Factor shows that our
observed difference is roughly equally consistent with the null
hypothesis of no difference as with a distribution centred at
the original effect size; it does not favour either hypothesis
over the other by more than a 2:1 ratio (although it is 1.95
times more consistent with the null than the alternative).
Given that the t-test was not statistically significant, we com-
pared the upper confidence bound around the observed effect
(observed effect: Cohen’s dz=0.11; 95% CI: [-0.01, 0.22]) to
the criterion value from our sensitivity power analysis (Co-
hen’s dz = 0.228) to determine whether the observed effect
was “inferior” to that planned minimum effect (Lakens et al.,
2018). Because the upper bound of the confidence interval
was smaller than 0.228, the observed difference between truth
ratings for the concrete and abstract statements was statisti-
cally inferior to a positive effect of Cohen’s dz = 0.228.
The same analysis conducted on the revised set of 52 items
– replacing items that were close for Swiss participants with
new items that were close for the UK or USA participants
(H1) — revealed a pattern that was similar to that for the orig-
inal 52 items: Average ratings for concrete items (M = 3.65,
S D = 0.42) were again about the same as those for abstract
items (M = 3.63, S D = 0.39), t(219) = 0.95, p = .170, BF10
(with rscale = 0.336) = 0.24. The Bayes Factor shows that
our observed difference is 4.23 times more consistent with
the null hypothesis of no difference than with a distribution
centred at the original effect size.
Given that the t-test was not statistically significant, we again
compared the upper confidence bound around the observed
effect (observed effect: Cohen’s dz=0.06; 95% CI: [-0.05,
0.17]) to the criterion value from our sensitivity power analy-
sis (Cohen’s dz = 0.228) to determine whether the observed
effect was “inferior” to that planned minimum effect. Because
the upper bound of the confidence interval was smaller than
0.228, the observed difference between truth ratings for the
concrete and abstract statements in the revised set of items
was statistically inferior to a positive effect of Cohen’s dz =
0.228.
Secondary exploratory analyses. As in Experiment 1a,
we tested whether a match between proximity and concrete-
ness increased truth ratings by comparing difference scores
(Concrete − Abstract) between the original (distant) and re-
placement (close) items (H2). Partially consistent with the
prediction that a match between proximity and concreteness
would increase truth judgements, the difference between con-
crete and abstract was positive for the close items (M=0.05),
but it was also positive for the distant items (M=0.06), and
near zero in both cases, t(219) = −0.26, p = .603.
Known Differences from the Original Study
The instructions, measures, and procedures were adapted di-
rectly from those of the original study. The original study was
conducted in German at the University of Basel in Switzer-
land, whereas our study was conducted in English at univer-
sities in the UK and USA. The first author of the original
study reviewed the translated statements and agreed that the
procedures should work with our populations. Upon realising
that truth value and concreteness were not fully crossed in
the original study design, we exchanged the concrete and
abstract versions of two items across sets A and B to ensure
that each set had equal number of items for each combina-
tion of true/false and concrete/abstract. Our primary analysis
combined across sets, and there is no theoretical reason to
expect this change to affect the outcome. Participants in the
original study were all undergraduate psychology students
who received course credit. Our sample in the USA also
consisted of undergraduate psychology students who received
course credit or extra credit for their participation. Our sample
in the UK was composed of undergraduates from psychology
and also included some masters students. For the UK sam-
ple, participants had a chance to win one of three £50 prizes
rather than receiving course credit. This compensation was
commensurate with that used by the original authors in their
Experiment 2 which tested the same hypothesis and used the
same materials as Experiment 1 (Hansen & Wänke, 2010, p.
1580). We added a check to ensure that participants did not
actually know the answers to any questions (see Procedure
section).
We included additional, culturally-aligned trivia items to the
study (see Materials section). Our participants therefore com-
pleted 60 (UK) or 70 (USA) statements rather than 52 in the
original study. The Qualtrics platform constrained the presen-
tation format of the statements resulting in more white space
between statements than in the original questionnaire. The
number of statements presented on each page was identical
for our paper-and-pencil and online formats, and differed from
the original study (see Materials section). We discussed these
changes in advance with the first author of the original paper,
and neither we nor they expected these changes to affect the
outcome.
In experiment 1b, data collection occurred online rather than
using the paper-and-pencil format of the original study.
Discussion
In Experiment 1a we attempted to replicate the linguistic
concreteness effect from Experiment 1 of Hansen and Wänke
(2010) in which participants judged concretely worded trivia
items as more probably true than abstractly worded versions
(H1). Concrete items were not rated as significantly truer
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than abstract items for either the original items or the revised
set of items, which is inconsistent with the original study.
The Bayes Factor for the original set favoured the null - a
distribution centred at no effect — over a distribution centred
at the original effect size by a 3.45:1 ratio. For the revised set,
it favoured the null by a ratio of 2.06:1. For the original items,
the upper bound of the confidence interval around the effect
was smaller than our smallest effect of interest, and therefore
also smaller than the original effect size, meaning that the
data were inconsistent with the original finding. Similarly, for
the revised items, the data were inconsistent with the original
finding. Collectively, these results do not provide evidence
for a linguistic concreteness effect on truth judgements.
In Experiment 1b, we extended our test of the linguistic con-
creteness effect to an online sample. Inconsistent with the
original study, concrete items were not rated as significantly
truer than abstract items for either the original items or the
revised set of items. The Bayes Factor for the original set
favoured the null over a distribution centred at the original
effect size by a 1.95:1 ratio. For the revised set, it favoured
the null by a ratio of 4.23:1. For the original items, the up-
per bound of the confidence interval around the effect was
smaller than our smallest effect of interest, and therefore also
smaller than the original effect size, meaning that the data
were inconsistent with the original finding. Similarly, for the
revised items, the data were inconsistent with the original
finding. Collectively, these results do not provide evidence
for a linguistic concreteness effect on truth judgments.
In designing these replications, we consulted the first author
of the original study to ensure that our replication matched
the procedures necessary to test the original hypothesis and
to verify that any changes were consistent with the original
conceptualization of the hypothesis. Still, by necessity, some
aspects of the design differed between the original study and
our replication attempt, and those differences might contribute
to the different outcome.
First, our study used English rather than German materials.
Although the change in language might contribute, neither
we nor Hansen suggested theoretical reasons why translated
materials would be ineffective in producing the effect. In-
deed Hansen and Wänke’s (2010) manipulation was based on
the linguistic category model (Semin & Fiedler, 1988, 1991)
which was developed based on experiments with English-
speaking participants.
Second, in developing the protocol, Hansen suggested the pos-
sibility that perceived psychological distance might interact
with the experimental manipulation (H2). Consequently, we
added additional trivia items intended to match the “distances”
of those items for our participants to the distance of the items
for the original Swiss participants. Our study showed no
effect of this distance manipulation; the close-distant effect
was close to zero and numerically in the opposite direction to
the prediction. Although it is possible that adding more trivia
items to the original set of 52 might dampen the effect, we saw
no difference in the pattern of results for the UK participants
(60 items) and USA participants (70 items) in either study.
If testing language, perceived proximity, or number of items
explain the different patterns of results between our studies
and the original study, then the effect might be specific to
theoretically uninteresting aspects of the testing context.
Our use of a 6-item response scale maximized the chances
of observing an effect because it lacked a neutral mid-point;
participants were forced to lean toward true or false for each
statement. Consequently, even a small linguistic concreteness
effect should nudge participants to make the appropriate di-
rectional response, leading to a measurable difference. Using
a scale with a neutral midpoint (e.g., 4 on a 1-7 scale) would
allow participants to ignore a slight sense of truth or falsity.6
Future research could consider using a scale with a neutral
midpoint. Future studies would also need a substantially
larger sample size in order to have adequate sensitivity to
measure a much smaller effect.
The aim of the present studies was to accumulate evidence for
the reliability of the linguistic concreteness effect and provide
a robust estimate of its size for use in subsequent studies. Our
experimental design and analyses were planned to optimise
the chances of observing the effect: In Experiment 1a we
collected data in a setting comparable to that of the original
study and used paper/pencil materials matched as closely as
possible to the original study. Experiment 1b adopted those
materials for online testing with a broader population using
Prolific. Each study had greater than 95% power to detect an
effect half the size of the original, and each produced evidence
more consistent with the absence of an effect than with the
original effect. Across these two studies, our analyzed sample
(466) was approximately ten times the size of the original
study (n=46). Although no single study is definitive about
the existence of an effect, our studies raise doubt about the
reliability of using concrete/abstract language as a way to
manipulate the judged truth of trivia statements.
6Hansen and Wänke (2010) reported no difference in average
ratings for true and false items. Across our studies and conditions,
a post-hoc analysis showed that true statements were rated slightly
higher than false statements (less than 0.20 rating points on average),
regardless of whether or not we excluded items that participants
claimed to have known). This small difference is difficult to interpret,
but it is consistent with a slight bias to respond on the larger end
of the scale (toward true) coupled with some limited sense about
the truth or falsity of items even when participants did not know the
answer.
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